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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Joseph Craig Newman (hereinafter "Newman") appeals from the district
court's order summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief.
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Underlving Criminal Proceedinss
The facts of Newman's crime and the procedural history are set forth in
State v. Newman, #25681 slip op. at 1-2 (Ct. App. April 16, 2002) (unpublished):
At the time of the events giving rise to this case, Joseph
Newman resided in a small house with his girlfriend, Karlene
Newsom, Newman's two teenage boys and ten-year-old daughter,
and Newsom's fifteen-year-old daughter. On July 27, 1998, a
friend of Newman, Carmelita Shaw, asked Newman to take care of
her three children while Shaw made a court appearance on a
criminal charge. The Shaw children were a six-year-old girl, an
eight-year-old boy, and eight-month-old Miranda. Ms. Shaw was
arrested later that day because she did not make the scheduled
court appearance. Consequently, the Shaw children remained in
the care of Newman and Newsom.
On August 23, 1998, at about 5:00 a.m., Newman checked
on Miranda and found that she was not breathing. Newman began
to perform CPR on Miranda while Newsom went to a nearby
convenience store to telephone for an ambulance. The responding
paramedics found that Miranda was not breathing and did not have
a pulse.
Medical efforts to revive her were unsuccessful.
Physicians who attended Miranda found that she was bruised in
many places and that her eyes showed retinal hemorrhaging, an
indication of shaken baby syndrome. A pathologist who performed
an autopsy determined that Miranda died from a severe blow to her
head with a blunt object that fractured her skull and from internal
bleeding in her brain consistent with shaken baby syndrome.
Newman and Newsom were both charged with felony injury
to a child, ldaho Code 9 18-1501(1). The State also sought a
persistent violator sentence enhancement, I.C. $$ 19-2514, against
Newman. Karlene Newsom pleaded guilty and received a unified
ten-year sentence with a five-year determinate term. See State v.
Newsom, 135 ldaho 89, 90, 14 P.3d 1083, 1084 (Ct. App. 2000).

Newman proceeded to trial and was found guilty. He then admitted
that he was subject to a persistent violator enhancement. The
district court imposed on Newman a unified life sentence with a
twenty-five-year minimum term.
The court of appeals identified Newman's issues on appeal:
On appeal, he challenges the constitutionality of the statute
under which he was convicted, contends that there were errors in
the admission of evidence at his trial, argues that the evidence is
insufficient to support the jury's verdict, and contends that his
sentence is excessive.
Id. at 1.
-

The appellate court affirmed Newman's judgment and sentence.

at

Statement of the Facts and Course of Post-Conviction Proceedinqs
Newman subsequently filed a timely post-conviction petition alleging trial
counsel violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel by
failing to: 1) file a motion to disqualify the judge; 2) file a motion for new trial
based on new evidence; 3) hire a defense pathologist; 4) maintain contact and
communication with Newman; and 5) effectively identify inconsistencies by a
witness's trial testimony and his comments in the pre-sentence investigation
report. (#29737 R., pp.2-6.)
The state filed an answer (#29737 R., pp.35-37) and a motion to dismiss
claiming Newman failed to provide evidence supporting his allegations (#29737
R., pp.23-34).

Newman filed a response claiming he possessed evidence

supporting his allegations and that he was entitled to the assistance of counsel to
properly present his claims. (#29737 R., pp.38-39.) The district court summarily
dismissed Newman's petition (#29737 R., pp.40-42) and Newman timely

appealed (#29737 R., pp.43-46). On appeal, Newman argued the district court
erred in dismissing his petition without giving adequate notice of the grounds for
dismissal and in denying his motion for appointment of counsel to assist him in
his post-conviction proceeding. Newman v. State, 140 ldaho 491, 492, 95 P.3d
642, 643 (Ct. App. 2004). The ldaho Court of Appeals determined the district
court erred because "Newman has alleged at least some claims which possibly
could be developed and supported with assistance of counsel to present a viable
basis for relief."

Id.at 494, 95 P.3d at 645.

On remand the district court appointed counsel (#35568 R., pp.3-22) who
filed an amended petition adding additional claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel and clarifying Newman's past claims (#35568 R., pp.28-41). The state
moved to dismiss. The district court granted that motion in part, but granted
Newman an evidentiary hearing on three claims. (#35568 R., pp.78-92.) Those
claims included Newman's claims that his attorney was ineffective for failing to 1)
move to disqualify Judge Woodland for bias, 2) hire a pathologist to assist in the
defense of the case, and 3) communicate with Newman following his conviction.
(#35568 R., pp.84-92.)
Prior to the evidentiary hearing counsel for Newman filed a motion
requesting the district court take judicial notice of twenty items, including
documents from Newman's underlying criminal and post-conviction cases as well
as filings and documents relating to his co-defendant, Ms. Newsom's case.

(Motion for Court to Take Judicial Notice, pp.2-3.') Newman also requested the
court take judicial notice of documents in a proceeding before the professional
conduct board of the ldaho State Bar involving Newman's trial counsel, Mr.
Eckert. (Motion for Court to Take Judicial Notice, pp.2-3.)
The documents in the bar proceeding included an amended complaint
alleging two counts of failing to respond to bar counsel in a disciplinary
proceeding. (Motion for Court to Take Judicial Notice, Exhibit J.) The basis of
the complaint was that Mr. Eckert received multiple letters from the ldaho State
Bar requesting him to communicate back to them and that Eckert "did not
respond to that letter as requested" as required by ldaho Rule of Professional
Conduct 8.l(b) and ldaho Bar Commission Rule 505(e). (Motion for Court to
Take Judicial Notice, Exhibit J.) Newman also requested the court take judicial
notice of the ldaho State Bar's Motion to Deem Admissions and for Imposition of
Sanction, the ldaho Supreme Court's order to show good cause why sanctions
should not be imposed and Mr. Eckert's response to that order wherein he
admitted that he failed to communicate with bar officials as required by the rules.
(Motion for Court to Take Judicial Notice, Exhibits K, L, M.)
Prior to the evidentiary hearing, the district court heard argument on
Newman's motion. The state objected to the district court taking judicial notice of
six items: 1) Newman's original petition for post-conviction relief; 2) Newman's
amended petition, including the attached exhibits; 3) Court Minute Order & Entry

This document is attached to Appellant's "Motion to Augment the Record" dated
April 9, 2009, an order granting the motion was issued on April 14, 2009.

of April 7, 1999, regarding the sentencing of Karlene M. Newsom in Case No.
CR-1998-493-FE; and 4) the documents before the board of professional
conduct. (#35568 Tr., p.13, L.10 - p.14, L.1.)
After hearing argument, the district court took judicial notice of all
documents that were part of the post-conviction file including the amended
petition: "The Court -- well, first of all, anything that's in this file, the post
conviction relief file, is part of the record that I'm going to base my decision on to
the extent that it's properly a matter of record at this hearing. Now, I'll take
judicial notice of the fact that there isn't an original petition for post conviction, the
fact that there's an amended petition which included exhibits." (#35568 Tr., p.22,
Ls.16-25.) The court also took judicial notice of the minute order prepared with
regard to the sentencing of Karlene M. Newsom. (#35568 Tr., p.25, Ls.10-13.)
The court did not, however, take judicial notice of the documents relating to bar
complaint against Mr. Eckert for failing to respond:
I am not going to take judicial notice for the reason that on the
record currently before me I do not have sufficient information to
meet the requirements of Rule 201 sub (b) of the Idaho Rules of
Evidence in that the fact of such filings or the content of such filings
are not matters that are generally known within the territorial
jurisdiction of this trial court and are not capable of accurate and
ready determination by resort to reach [sic] the sources of accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned on this record. So I'm not going
to take judicial notice of that.
I would note additionally that I think the relevance is fairly
remote. I'm understanding that your argument is that because Mr.
Eckert was disciplined for failing to respond to inquires from bar
counsel regarding complaints that had been made against him with
the bar counsel that that must somehow make it more likely that he
did not respond to requests from Mr. Newman during the case that
had happened some months if not years -- I'll check the exact date
-- prior to the date of the bar counsel's letters to Mr. Eckert. I think

that's pretty slim, but in any event I'm not going to take judicial
notice of those items.
(#35568 Tr., p.27, L.14 - p.28, L.13.)
Following the evidentiary hearing, the district court issued a Memorandum
Decision and Order on Petition for Post-Conviction Relief denying Newman's
request to vacate the sentence and judgment of conviction. (#35568 R., p.99.)
The district court made clear that it "reviewed the Petition and Affidavit for PostConviction Relief, the State's Answer, Petitioner's Response to Answer to
Dismiss Post Conviction Relief, and Petitioner's Post Conviction Relief Petition
Amendment and the Affidavits of Joseph Newman in Support, Petitioner's Motion
for Court to Take Judicial Notice, the original file for Bannock County Case CrFE-1998-494-A, and accompanying transcripts" as well as the testimony
presented at the hearing. (#35568 R., p.99.)
Regarding Newman's claim that Mr. Eckert provided ineffective assistance
of counsel in allowing Judge Woodland to preside over the trial, the district court
concluded that the decision to not seek disqualification was strategic, that Mr.
Eckert "accounted for the evidence and incidents that would provide cause to
disqualify the court and weighed the chance of success against the danger of
prejudicing the court." (#35568 R., p.117.) The district court found that Mr.
Eckert "discussed the possibility of seeking disqualification with the prosecutor
and Judge Woodland and determined that such a motion would be futile."
(#35568 R., p.117.)

The district court also reasoned that "[c]ounsel for

Newman's co-defendant [Ms. Newsom] had similar concerns and decided not to
seek disqualification for cause." (#35568 R., p.117.) The district court further

concluded that Newman "did not present evidence of overt bias on the part of
Judge Woodland to show that any part of the trial proceedings was prejudiced."
(#35568 R., p.117.)
With regard to Newman's claim that his attorney was ineffective for falling
to hire a pathologist, the district court concluded that Mr. Eckert's "decision not to
hire an independent pathologist was a strategic decision." (#35568 R., p.117.)
The district court found that the two pathologists contacted by Mr. Eckert could
not rebut the State's conclusions from the evidence and "would buttress the
State's case" and that Mr. Eckert "provided effective representation in deciding
not to hire an independent pathologist." (#35568 R., p.118.)
On Newman's final claim, whether Mr. Eckert was ineffective for failing to
communicate with Newman after trial about seeking a new trial, the district court
determined that Mr. Eckert "sent Newman a letter agreeing to seek a new trial"
but that Mr. "Eckert followed up on the alleged newly discovered evidence and
could not find sufficient evidence to justify a request for a new trial." (#35568 R.,
p.118.)

The court further concluded that Mr. Eckert's decision "not to file a

Motion for New Trial is supported by facts and was not ineffective assistance of
counsel." (#35568 R., p.118.)
Accordingly, because the district court found in favor of the state on each
of the three issues, the district court denied Newman's request for postconviction relief.

(#35568 R., p.119.)

Newman timely appeals from that

memorandum decision and order. (#35568 R., pp.121-24.)

ISSUES
Newman states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court err when it failed to take judicial notice
of the ldaho State Bar Professional Conduct Board's actions
against Thomas Eckert and the ldaho Supreme Court's
Order addressing the State Bar's proceeding against Mr.
Eckert which were submitted to the district court?

2

Did the district court err when it failed to properly take judicial
notice of Mr. Newman's underlying criminal case and his
post conviction action prior to the Court of Appeals remand?

(Appellant's Brief, p. 10.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Did the district court properly exercise its discretion by not taking judicial
notice of records that were not from the court file in the same or a
separate case, where the accuracy and content of those documents were
not capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources
whose accuracy could not be reasonably questioned, and where those
documents and the content of those documents were irrelevant to the
petitioner's claims?

2.

Did the district court review judicially noticed documents and pr'operly
weigh and evaluate the contents of those judicially noticed documents?

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Properlv Exercised Its Discretion Bv Not Takinq Judicial Notice
Of Documents Of A Disciplinary Proceedinq That Were Irrelevant To This Case
And That Did Not Meet The Requirements Of I.R.E. 201(b)
A.

Introduction
Newman contends the district court erred in failing to take judicial notice of

documents in a matter before the professional conduct board of the ldaho State
Bar. (Appellant's Brief, p.1I.) Newman's argument fails for three reasons. First,
Newman fails to appreciate the court's discretion on matters of judicial notice and
has cited no authority for his proposition that the district court was required to
take judicial notice of matters of the documents at issue. Second, documents in
matters before the professional conduct board do not meet the requirements of
I.R.E. 201(b). Third, even if the filing of those documents or the content of those
documents were the type of facts that a trial court could take judicial notice of,
they were not facts relevant to the case at hand, and therefore, not admissible.
B.

I.R.E. 201 Does Not Require A Court To Take Judicial Notice Of
Confidential Proceedinas Before The Professional Conduct Board Of The
ldaho State Bar
"Judicial notice is a mechanism enabling a judge to excuse the party

having the burden of establishing a fact from producing formal proof of that fact."
Brazier v. Brazier, 111 ldaho 692, 700, 726 P.2d 1143, 1151 (Ct. App. 1986).
There are, however, limits to trial courts being able to excuse parties from laying
traditional foundation. "A judicially noticed fact must be free from reasonable
dispute because it is either I ) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of

the trial court or 2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to
sources whose accuracy cannot readily be questioned."

Id.

(citing I.R.E. 201;

Citv of Lewiston v. Frary, 91 ldaho 322,420 P.2d 805 (1966).) Pursuant to I.R.E.
201(c), it is discretionary for the court to take judicial notice of evidence that
meets these two requirements. Taking judicial notice is mandatory, however,
only when a party requests "judicial notice of records, exhibits or transcripts from
the court file in fhe same or a separate case . . ."

I.R.E. 201(c) (emphasis

added)
As a threshold mater, the documents submitted by Newman were not from
the court file in the same or a separate case. Rather, the documents submitted
by Newman relate to an action in front of the professional conduct board of the
ldaho State Bar. As such, there is no court file and the proceedings do not
constitute facts of which the district court is required to take judicial notice. As a
result, the district court's decision to excuse Newman from making a formal offer
of proof regarding these documents was entirely discretionary and, therefore, is
not a basis for reversal.'
Additionally, the contents of documents in an action before the board of
professional conduct do not meet the two-fold requirements of I.R.E. 201(b). At
the hearing on the issue of judicial notice, the state objected to the documents

* It should be noted that there is no ldaho case where the court's failure to take
judicial notice constituted reversible error. The decision to not take judicial notice
merely precludes a defendant from the convenience of admitting evidence
without laying foundation. The failure to take judicial notice does not preclude a
defendant from laying the foundation and admitting the fact through other means.
Newman has cited no authority for the proposition that a court's refusal to take
judicial notice is a basis for reversible error.

relating to the matter before the professional conduct board that concerned Mr.
Eckert. Newman responded by arguing the contents of documents showed Mr.
Eckert failed to follow reasonable instructions and that the documents were
evidence that Mr. Eckert failed to follow Newman's instructions in his case. In
response, the district court asked Newman if they met the requirements of I.R.E.
201, specifically whether the documents were capable of accurate and ready
determination:
The Court: All right. How would you contend that these
particular documents meet the requirements of Rule 201 of the
Idaho Rules of Evidence which requires that a judicially [sic] notice
of fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute and that it is
generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or
capable of accurate and rendered determination by resort to
sources whose accuracy can not reasonably be questioned?

Mr. French: Your Honor, as far as our Rule 201 goes, I just
direct the Court back to my comments earlier that these four
documents are from the bar position.
The Court:

How do I know that?

Mr. French:

I think they're self-authenticating.

The Court:

How so?

Mr. French: They're titled, they give a case number on
them, they have signatures on them, they're file stamped.
The Court: Do I have the right to go into the records of the
bar counsel and go see what's there?
Mr. French: No, Your Honor. Those documents are
confidential in the nature of how they are stamped. They're
stamped in. They're dated and -The Court:
on that then. . . .

All right. I'm not going to hear anything more

(#35568 Tr., p.21, L.2 - p.22, L.11.)

Because of the confidential nature of

proceedings and filings with the ldaho Bar, the filings and particularly the claims
in those filings are not matters that can be readily determined. Consequently, to
be introduced into evidence, it makes sense for district courts to require a formal
offer of proof with requisite foundation
Finally, it was not error for the district court to refuse to take judicial notice
of documents in the professional conduct board proceeding because the filings in
that case were not relevant to Newman's post-conviction claims. As argued by
the state:
I'll just make this argument for all (j), (k), (I), and (m), Your Honor. I
don't think that's relevant here.
The decision that was made in that case with the ldaho State
Bar and the decision that was written by the ldaho Supreme Court
specifically relates to Mr. Eckert's ethical violations based on him
not responding to the ldaho State Bar. That decision has nothing to
do with Mr. Newman's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
that specifically we're dealing with here today. None of that came
up. It was for reasons not responding to letters sent to Mr. Eckert
by the ldaho State Bar. I don't see how that's applicable here and
would object to relevance on those grounds, Your Honor.
(#35568 Tr., p.18, Ls.6-20.) Newman responded by arguing that the allegations
in the proceeding were in essence I.R.E. 404(b) evidence -- evidence of prior bad
acts:
Mr. French: Well, I demonstrate, Your Honor, that Mr.
Eckert failed to follow the instructions that were given to him by his
client in this matter. Mr. Newman's complaining party gave
instructions to Mr. Eckert during his representation. And so if I can
direct the Court's attention to -The Court: So you're basically saying that its prior
subsequent [sic] bad acts.

Mr. French:

Yes. That would be correct.

(#35568 Tr., p.20, Ls.2-10.)

The district court, after hearing argument,

substantially agreed with the state:
I would note additionally that I think the relevance is fairly remote.
I'm understanding that your argument is that because Mr. Eckert
was disciplined for failing to respond to inquires from bar counsel
regarding complaints that had been made against him with the bar
counsel that he must somehow make it more likely that he did not
respond to requests from Mr. Newman during the case that had
happened some months if not years -- I'll check the exact date -prior to the date of the bar counsel's letters to Mr. Eckert. I think
that's pretty slim, but in any event I'm not going to take judicial
notice of those items.

The state's objection and the district court's assessments are correct. The
bar complaint before the professional conduct board of the ldaho State Bar
merely alleged Mr. Eckert was in violation of ldaho Rule of Professional Conduct
8.l(b) ("Failure to Respond to Lawful Demand for Information from a Disciplinary
Authority") and ldaho Bar Commission Rule 505(e) ("Failure to Respond to
Disciplinary Authorities").

(SeeMotion to Augment the Record and Statement in

Support Thereof, Exhibit J.) The subsequent order found Mr. Eckert in violation
of those rules, and ordered him to explain why he failed to respond to bar
counsel's inquiries.

(See Motion

to Augment the Record and Statement in

Support Thereof, Exhibit L.) Mr. Eckert responded by admitting to his failure to
respond to bar counsel.

(SeeMotion to Augment the Record and Statement in

Support Thereof, Exhibit M.)

A failure to respond to inquires by the ldaho State Bar does not make a
material issue of fact in Newman's post-conviction petition more or less likely.
Mr. Eckert's failure to respond to the ldaho Bar does not make it more or less
likely that he was ineffective for not disqualifying the judge for bias, that his
decision to not hire a pathologist was any less strategic, or that he did not
communicate with Newman following his conviction. Consequently, the filing of
these documents was not relevant to the adjudication of Newsom's postconviction claims and regardless of whether the documents were of the type of
facts that a court could take judicial notice of -- per the facts of this case, they
were facts that were irrelevant and, therefore, inadmissible.
In sum, the district court properly denied Newman's request that the court
take judicial notice of the documents in the board of professional conduct
proceedings. Judicial notice was not required and the documents did not meet
the requirements of I.R.E. 201. Further, even if the court could take judicial
notice of the documents, the documents were irrelevant to Newman's postconviction claims and therefore not admissible as evidence.
II.
The District Court Properly Exercised Its Discretion By Evaluatinq And Giving
Weight To Judicially Noticed Items
Newman claims that although the district court "stated it was taking judicial
notice of Mr. Newman's underlying criminal file, as well as his post conviction
action prior to the Court of Appeals" that "it did not consider anything in the files it
purportedly took judicial notice of." (Appellant's Brief, p.16.) Newman's claim is

without merit. Newman bases his argument on a comment made by the district
court during the hearing regarding a preliminary hearing transcript -- that
although it would take judicial notice of the transcript being prepared or filed such
judicial notice does not "necessarily" mean that the judge would consider as fact
the contents of the document. (Appellant's Brief, p.18.) Newman's argument is
baseless. The district court explicitly stated that its decision to deny Newman's
petition was made after a review of his underlying criminal file and postconviction file. Furthermore, Newman fails to appreciate that it is proper for a
court to take judicial notice of the existence of court documents and then weigh
and evaluate the contents of those documents as any other evidence rather than
accepting the content as judicially noticed fact,
As an initial matter, Newman's claim that the district court did not consider
the documents it took judicial notice of is directly contradicted by the record. The
district court's order clearly states that the court reached its decision after the
court "reviewed" Newman's original underlying criminal case and his initial postconviction file:
Having reviewed the Petition and Affidavit for Post-Conviction
Relief, the State's Answer, Petitioner's Response to Answer to
Dismiss Post Conviction Relief, and Petitioner's Post Conviction
Relief Petition Amendment and the Affidavits of Joseph Newman in
Support, Petitioner's Motion for Court to Take Judicial Notice, the
original file for Bannock County Case Cr-FE-1998-494-A, and
accompanying transcripts, and having heard testimony and
argument on the matter, the Court DENIES Petitioner's request to
vacate the sentence and judgment of conviction.
(Memorandum Decision and Order on Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, p.1.)
Thus, regardless of what the district court may have previously stated with regard

to what it may or might not do, the record contains a direct statement of what the
court actually did. Accordingly, Newman's claim is without merit. The district
court reviewed the document as part of its decision to deny Newman's petition.
Furthermore, there was nothing improper regarding the district court's
statement that although it would take judicial notice of the document it would not
necessarily consider the content of the document as fact:
I'll take judicial notice of the fact that a preliminary hearing
transcript was prepared in regard to a preliminary hearing that
occurred on September 9, 1998. Again, that doesn't necessarily
mean that I'm going to consider what was in it [as fact]. I'm taking
notice of the fact that there was one prepared, which is what its all
about.

(#35568 Tr., p.24, Ls.7-13.) It makes sense that the court would take judicial
notice of the filing or creation of the preliminary hearing transcript because such
facts are "capable of accurate and ready demonstration." See Rule 201(b).
However, the accuracy of the statements within the transcript is something
different. The truthfulness of those statements are not taken as judicially noticed
fact, but rather evidence to be weighed just like any other statement admitted into
evidence.

See One Hour Cleaners v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office of State of

Cola., 914 P.2d 501, 505 (Colo. App. 1995) ("We recognize that a court can take
judicial notice of its own records and files. However, these documents did not
state facts that can be judicially noticed under CRE 201. The statements
supported petitioners' position on the very issue the parties were litigating and do
not set out facts that are generally known or capable of accurate and ready
determination as required under CRE 201.") (citing J. Wigmore, Evidence 5 2567
(1981)); see also Garcia v. Sterling, 221 Cal. Rptr. 349, 352 (Cal. App.1985)

("Although the existence of statements contained in a deposition transcript filed
as part of the court record can be judicially noticed, their truth is not subject to
judicial notice."). Thus, here, it was entirely proper for the district court to take
judicial notice of court documents but not accept the contents of those
documents as fact. Accordingly, Newman has failed to show any reversible
error.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order denying Newman's request to vacate his sentence and judgment of
conviction.
DATED this 28th day of May 2009.
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